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41-6-45

41-6-45.

MOTOR VEHICLES

Reckless

driving -

Penalty.

(1) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a first conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not fewer than five days, or a minimum fine of not less than $25. On a
second or subsequent conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less than $50.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943,
57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 9; 1986, ch. 178,
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 44; 1987, ch. 204, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment rewrote Subsection (2).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, substituted "A person who operates" for "Any person who drives" in Subsection (1) and made
minor changes in phraseology in the second
and third sentences of Subsection (2).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 204, made

minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References.
- Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Sentencing
for felonies,
§§ 76-3-201,
76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-30L

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey, 65

Utah 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925), reviewed, State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157
P.2d 258 (1945).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 312 et seq.
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§§ 609
to 624.
A.L.R. - Validity, construction, and application of criminal statutes specifically directed
against racing of automobiles on public streets
or highways (drag racing), 24 A.L.R.3d 1286.

Liability of one fleeing police for injury resulting from collision of police vehicle with another vehicle, person, or object, 51 A.L.R.3d
1226.
Statute prohibiting reckless driving: definiteness and certainty, 52 A.L.R.4th 1161.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 330.

ARTICLE 6
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
41-6-46.

Speed regulationsSafe and appropriate speeds
at certain locations - Prima facie speed limits Emergency power of the governor.

(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, including, but not limited to when:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and
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(e) special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or
by reason of weather or highway conditions.
(2) Where no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (3) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful. Any speed in excess
of these limits is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or
prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a school building or its grounds
during school recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or closing hours, except that local authorities may require a
complete stop before passing a school building or grounds at any of these
periods;
(b) twenty-five miles per hour in any urban district; and
(c) fifty-five miles per hour in other locations.
(3) The Governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change
the speed limits on the highways of the state.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L.
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 45;
1987 (1st S.S.), ch. I, § 1.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1978
(2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1 repealed former § 41-6-46
(L. 1941, ch. 52, § 36; C. 1943, 57-7-113; L.
1951, ch. 72, § 1; 1957, ch. 76, § l; 1959, ch.
66, § l; 1978, ch. 34, § 1), relating to speed
regulations, and enacted present § 41-6-46.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) in the opening clause
substituted "operate" for "drive," designated
the previously undesignated second sentence of
this subsection, substituted "including, but not
limited to when" for "Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and
appropriate speed when," in Subsection (2) inserted "and subject to Subsection (3) and
§§ 41-6-47 and 41-6-48" following "special hazard exists," deleted the former undesignated
last sentence of Subsection (2) and made minor

changes in phraseolgy
and punctuation
throughout the section.
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
May 20, 1987, in Subsection (1), inserted "existing" and substituted "giving" for "having" in
the introductory paragraph and substituted
"regarding" for "with respect to" and "due to"
for "by reason of' in Subsection (e); and, in
Subsection (2), substituted "during" for "at"
near the end of Subsection (a), inserted present
Subsection (c), and redesignated former Subsection (c) as present Subsection (d).
Legislative Intent. - Laws 1987 (1st S.S.),
ch. 1, § 2 states the legislative intent that all
sections of the Utah highway which qualify under § 41-6-46(2)(c) for the 65 miles per hour
speed limit be posted at 65, subject to the provisions of§§ 41-6-47 and 41-6-48 regarding reasonable and safe speed limits.
Cross-References.
- Municipal regulations, § 10-8-30.
Reckless driving, § 41-6-45.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Construction and application.
Former jeopardy.
Instructions.
Motor carriers and buses.
National emergency.
Negligence.
Pleadings and proceedings.
Questions of law and fact.
Constitutionality.
A former speed law was held constitutional
as against contention that it violated Utah constitutional provision, providing that no bill
shall be passed containing more than one sub-

ject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. State v. Brown, 75 Utah 37, 282 P. 785
(1928).
This section is not unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470 (Utah 1981).
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Construction and application.
This section requires that driver shall not
drive at speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent in view of existing conditions and hazards on highway, that his speed shall be controlled so as to avoid colliding with other vehicle~ entering or upon highway in lawful manner, and that speed shall be appropriately reduced when special hazards exist with respect
to other traffic or by reason of weather conditions. Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186
P.2d 592 (1947).
Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist charged with speeding under this section does not bar subsequent
prosecution for involuntary manslaughter.
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258
(1945).
Instructions.
In action arising out of car-pedestrian accident in California, evidence did not justify instruction that defendant had duty to drive car
in conformity with California statute providing
that no person shall drive vehicle at speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent, where
there was no evidence that defendant's speed of
20 to 25 miles per hour was excessive or unreasonable. (Deering's Cal. Vehicle Code § 510.)
Hunter v. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242, 198 P.2d
245 (1948).
Where defendant failed to see small child in
the street until it was too late to avoid striking
him, the trial court should have instructed jury
that driver is charged with duty of seeing what
he would have seen had he been exercising reasonable care, since evidence showed motorist
should have seen the child much sooner; instructing jury on right to assume others will
perform their legal duties and on sudden or
unexpected situation arising without fault on
defendant's part was reversible error. Solt v.
Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (1971).
Motor carriers and buses.
Driver of vehicle carrying passengers for
hire owes them duty to operate vehicle within
such rate of speed as reasonably prudent person would operate under existing conditions,
and, where road and weather conditions make
driving hazardous, reasonable prudence requires proportionate increase in care of driver
to avoid injury to passengers. Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947).
Where bus, while traveling between 20 and
50 miles per hour under very hazardous conditions on outside lane on main highway which
was covered with ice and slush, collided with
automobile approaching from opposite direction which went out of control and skidded into
path of bus, and distance between bus and automobile, when it first became discernible that
latter was out of control, was between 30 and

330 feet, evidence was sufficient to sustain verdict in favor of injured bus passenger for hire
as against bus company, in that jury could conclude therefrom that bus driver was neligent in
operating bus at excessive rate of speed under
such circumstances, which was proximate
cause of collision. Horsley v. Robinson, 112
Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947).

National emergency.
"National emergency" as used in former provision authorizing governor to change speed
limit by proclamation meant an unforeseen
combination of circumstances calling for immediate action by national leaders and support
from citizens for the safety, peace, health and
general welfare of the nation; the 1973 Arab
oil embargo was such an emergency and governor could validly reduce state-wide speed limit
to 55 miles per hour by proclamation. State v.
Foukas, 560 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977).
Validly issued proclamation by governor setting speed limit could be terminated by governor's proclamation, by legislative action, or by
judicial holding that the circumstances had so
changed that the proclamation could no longer
serve any useful purpose; governor's proclamation limiting speed limit to 55 miles per hour
had not been terminated as of December 2,
1976. In re Prisbrey, 576 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1978).
Negligence.
Ordinarily it is not negligence to operate a
motor vehicle within the speed limit prescribed
by statute or ordinance, although a jury may
say in some instances, dependent upon the particular attendant facts and circumstances, that
the operation of an automobile within prescribed limit is nevertheless
negligence.
Lochhead v. Jensen, 42 Utah 99, 129 P. 347
(1912).
Violation of speed regulations may constitute negligence per se. Jensen v. Utah Light &
Ry., 42 Utah 415, 132 P. 8 (1913).
Operating a motor vehicle at less than the
lawful maximum speed may constitute negligence under given circumstances. Fowkes v.
J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46 Utah 502,
151 P. 53 (1915).
It has long been the rule in this state that it
is negligence as a matter of law to drive an
automobile upon a traveled public highway at
such rate of speed that said automobile cannot
be stopped within distance at which operator of
said car is able to see objects upon highway in
front of him. Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy
Prods. Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309 (1932).
When a driver upon a public highway with
his light equipment cannot see more than 50
feet ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at such
speed as will enable him to stop within that
distance. Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P.2d
1366, 104 A.L.R. 943 (1936).
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For general discussion as to speed and civil
liability with respect thereto, see opinions by
Wade,Wolfe and Pratt, JJ., in Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947).
Where fog was so great that visibility was
limitedto 20 or 25 feet and a safe speed under
thoseconditions was about five miles per hour,
the court cannot say as a matter of law that the
plaintiffwas not negligent in operating his car
at the rate of 25 miles per hour. Shields v.
Ramon, 122 Utah 474, 251 P.2d 671 (1952).
Driving in excess of speed limit may constitute prima facie evidence of negligence, but
does not constitute
conclusive evidence.
Cardon v. Brenchley, 575 P.2d 184 (Utah
1978).

Pleadings and proceedings.
If the complaint is fatally defective in its allegations when viewed as an attempt to bring
defendantwithin the provisions of this section,
judgment for plaintiff will be reversed. Woodwardv. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 578,
63 P.2d 267 (1936).
Questions of law and fact.
Whether the speed at which the vehicle was
goingat the time was the proximate cause of

41-6-47

the accident is a question of fact. Sweet v. Salt
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913).
In action arising out of intersection collision,
evidence sufficiently established prima facie
case of negligence on part of defendant in failing to yield right-of-way and in traveling at
excessive rate of speed, and contributory negligence on part of plaintiff in failing to keep
proper lookout and in traveling at excessive
rate of speed was for jury. Martin v. Sheffield,
112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127 (1948).
What is a reasonable and prudent speed under the conditions and having regard to the
actual and potential hazards then existing is a
matter about which there is room for reasonable disagreement and such being the case, a
jury question is presented. Lodder v. Western
Pac. R.R., 123 Utah 316, 259 P.2d 589 (1953).
In action against motorist for death of decedent, who was killed while hitching small tractor to rear of an automobile, it was a question
of fact for the jury whether motorist was negligent in failing to reduce her speed below 50
miles per hour when she saw wrecker ahead of
her on the highway. Taylor v. Johnson, 15
Utah 2d 342, 393 P.2d 382 (1964).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 218 et seq.
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 641
to 650.
A.L.R.- Indefiniteness of automobile speed
regulations as affecting validity, 6 A.L.R.3d
1326.
Speeding prosecution based on observation
from aircraft, 23 A.L.R.3d 1446.
Validity, construction, and application of
criminal statutes specifically directed against
racing of automobiles on public streets or highway (drag racing), 24 A.L.R.3d 1286.

Opinion testimony as to speed of motor vehicle based on skid marks and other facts, 29
A.L.R.3d 248.
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle
involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Proof, by radar or other mechanical or electronic devices, of violation of speed regulations,
47 A.L.R.3d 822.
Liability of public authority for injury arising out of automobile race conducted on street
or highway, 80 A.L.R.3d 1192.
Key Numbers. - Automobile """ 331.

41-6-47. Prima facie speed limit.
(1) (a) When the Department of Transportation determines upon the basis
of an engineering and traffic investigation that any prima facie speed
under this article is not reasonable or safe under the existing conditions
at any intersection or other place or on a state highway, the Department
of Transportation may determine a reasonable and safe prima facie speed
limit.
(b) When changing a speed limit, the Department of Transportation
shall consult with local political units prior to erecting or changing any
signs within local political boundaries.
(2) The speed limit is effective when appropriate signs giving notice are
erected at the intersection or other place or part of the highway.
441

41-6-48

MOTOR VEHICLES

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 37; C. 1943,
57-7-114; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1979, ch. 242,
§ 13; 1987, ch. 138, § 46; 1988, ch. 167, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.

The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, inserted the subsection designation (l)(a)
at the beginning of the section; added Subsection (l)(b); inserted subsection designation (2);
and made minor stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
response to President's request without engineering or traffic investigation or finding that
prior limit was unreasonable or unsafe. State
v. Foukas, 560 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977).

State-wide speed reduction.
State road commission had no authority under this section to pass ordinance reducing
state-wide speed limit to 55 miles per hour in

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. -

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 218 et seq.

61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 641

to 650.

Key Numbers. -

41-6-48.

Speed restrictions
- Posted speed.

-

Automobiles

¢=>

331.

Powers of local authorities

(1) When local authorities in their respective jurisdictions determine on the
basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that the prima facie speed
permitted under this article is not reasonable and safe under the conditions
found to exist upon a highway or part of a highway, the local authority may
determine a reasonable and safe prima facie limit which:
(a) decreases the limit at intersections;
(b) increases the limit within an urban district; or
(c) decreases the limit outside an urban district, but not to less than 35
miles per hour.
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall determine by an
engineering and traffic investigation the prima facie speed for all highways
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare a reasonable and safe
prima facie limit, which may be different than the prima facie speed permitted under this chapter for an urban district.
(3) Any limit altered under this section is effective when appropriate signs
giving notice are erected upon the highway.
(4) The Department of Transportation determines prima facie evidence of a
lawful speed on state highways whether the highways are within or without
the corporate limits of any city.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-48, enacted by L. restrictions and powers of local authorities,
1975, ch. 207, § 13; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 10; and enacted present § 41-6-48.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend1987, ch. 138, § 47.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1975, . ment in Subsection (2) substituted "highways
ch. 207, § 14 repealed former § 41-6-48 (L. under their respective jurisdictions" for "arte·
1941, ch. 52, § 38; C. 1943, 57-7-115; L. 1949, rial streets," in Subsection (3) substituted "the
ch. 65, § 1; 1951 (1st S.S.), ch. 12, § l; 1957, highway" for "such street or highway" and
made minor changes in phraseology and puncch. 77, § l; 1973, ch. 81, § 3), relating to speed
tuation throughout the section.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S Motor Vehicles § 290.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 168(1).

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 219.

41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations.
(1) A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a speed so slow as to
impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when:
(a) reduced speed is necessary for safe operation;
(b) upon a grade; or
(c) in compliance with official traffic control devices.
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled access highway at less than
the lawful maximum speed side by side with and at the same speed as a
vehicle operated in the adjacent right lane constitutes evidence of impeding or
blocking normal movement of traffic.
(3) When the Department of Transportation or local authorities within
their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of an engineering and
traffic investigation that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently
impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the Department of
Transportation or local authority may determine and shall post a minimum
speed limit below which no person may operate a vehicle except when necessary for safe operation.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 39; C. 1943,
57-7-116; L. 1955, ch. 71, § l; 1967, ch. 89,
§ l; 1969, ch. 108, § l; 1979, ch. 242, § 14;
1983, ch. 337, § 2; 1987, ch. 138, § 48.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "operate"
for "drive," deleted the former Subsection (c)
which read "reduced speed is necessary because of adverse weather conditions," deleted
Subsection (e) which read "preparing to turn
left or enter a left lane exit ramp" and redesig-

nated the remaining subsections; in Subsection
(3) substituted "operate" for "drive"; deleted
the former Subsection (4) which read "A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor";
and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.
Cross-References. - Slow-moving vehicle,
§ 41-6-138.
"Utah
Horseless
Carriage"
exempt,
§ 41-21-3.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 228.

C.J.S. - 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 588.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 324.

41-6-50. Special speed limit Qn bridges dence.

Prima facie evi-

(1) A person may not operate a vehicle over any bridge or other elevated
structure which is a part of a highway at a speed which is greater than the
maximum speed which may be maintained with safety on the bridge or structure, when the structure is signposted under this section.
(2) The Department of Transportation upon request from any local authority shall, or upon its own initiative, may conduct an investigation of any
bridge or other elevated structure which is a part of a highway. If it finds the
structure may not with safety withstand vehicles traveling at the speed otherwise permissible under this chapter, the Department of Transportation shall
determine the maximum speed of vehicles which the structure can withstand,
443
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and shall cause or permit suitable signs stating the maximum speed to be
erected and maintained before each end of the structure.
(3) Upon the trial of a person charged with a violation of this section, proof
of the determination of the maximum speed by the Department of Transportation and the existence of the signs constitute conclusive evidence of the maximum speed which may be maintained with safety on the bridge or structure.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 40; C. 1943,
57-7-117; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 11; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 49.

41-6-51.

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.

Speed contest or exhibition
cade or obstruction.

on highway - Barri-

(1) A person may not engage in any motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway or aid or abet in any motor vehicle speed contest or
exhibition on any highway.
(2) A person may not, for the purpose of facilitating or aiding or as an
incident to any motor vehicle speed contest upon a highway, in any manner
obstruct or place any barricade or obstruction or assist or participate in placing any barricade or obstruction upon any highway.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-118.10, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1987, ch. 138, § 50.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment redesignated the provisions of this sec•
tion and made minor changes in phraseology
and punctuation throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence of negligence.
Racing motor vehicles on public streets and
highways in violation of this section consti•

tutes prima facie evidence of negligence. Little
America Ref. Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah
1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 323.
C.J.S. 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles
§ 641(1).
A.L.R. - Validity, construction, and appli-

41-6-52.

Speed violation -

cation of criminal statutes, specifically directed
against racing of automobiles on public streets
or highways (drag racing), 24 A.L.R.3d 1286.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <t=> 6.

Complaint -

Civil negligence.

(1) In every charge of violation of any speed provision of this article, the
complaint and the summons or notice to appear shall specify the speed at
which the defendant is alleged to have operated a vehicle, also the prima facie
speed applicable within the district or at the location.
(2) The provisions of this article declaring prima facie speed limitations do
not relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate cause of an accident.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 42; C. 1943,
57-7-119; 1987, ch. 138, § 51.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the provisions of this sec-

tion, in Subsection (1) substituted "provision of
this article" for "regulation in this act" and
substituted "operated a vehicle" for "driven,"
in Subsection (2) substituted "article" for "act,"
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and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 588.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 351.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 231.

41-6-52.1. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 41-6-52.1 (L. 1957, ch.
77, § 2), relating to resume speed road signs,
was repealed by Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 61.

ARTICLE 7
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING ON
RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, OVERTAKING,
PASSING AND OTHER RULES OF
THE ROAD
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway
- Exceptions.
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the
right half of the roadway, except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction under the rules governing that movement;
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to all
vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions
of the highway within a distance constituting an immediate hazard;
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the
applicable rules; or
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic.
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of
traffic under the existing conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or
edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an
intersection or into a private road or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 43; C. 1943,
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 52.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the provisions of this sec-

tion, substituted "operated" for "driven" in
Subsections (1) and (2), and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Backing.
Bicycle and truck.
Effect of passing from right to center.
"Half of the roadway" construed.
Instructions.
Negligence.
Presumptions.
Questions for jury.
Violation as evidence of negligence.
Backing.
Statutes requmng that vehicles keep to
right have no applicability to backing. Naisbitt
v. Eggett, 5 Utah 2d 5, 295 P.2d 832 (1956).
Bicycle and truck.
The driver of a truck who was on right side
of street and was not on, near to, or approaching a crossing where both vehicles and pedestrians might pass either or both ways, had the
right to relax his vigilance and was not required to do more than to maintain such lookout as would prevent his colliding or coming in
contact with anyone on his side of street. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186
P. 439 (1919).

have been laid out originally. Patton v. Kirkman, 109 Utah 487, 167 P.2d 282 (1946).
Instructions.
Where collision takes place upon street having four traffic lanes, it is proper to instruct as
to duty of defendant to use right traffic lane,
and as to duty of the respective parties to use
lane 4 rather than lane 3, where the evidence
warrants such instruction. Thomas v. Sadleir,
108 Utah 552, 162 P.2d 112 (1945).
Negligence.
The strongest kind of presumption of negligence prevails against party driving on wrong
side of road. Staton v. Western Macaroni Mfg.
Co., 52 Utah 426, 174 P. 821 (1918).

Effect of passing from right to center.
While in case a street or highway is not used
by others one may drive on any part thereof,
yet, when a motorist or bicyclist passes from
right to left of the center of the street, he loses
some of his rights, and he may not be heard to
complain of the conduct of those who are on the
proper side of street to the same extent as
though he also were on the proper side. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186
P. 439 (1919).
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries
sustained as result of collision with automobile
at intersection, instruction that motorist had
right to presume that every other person would
obey law by traveling on right-hand side of
road, and that no duty rested upon motorist to
stop or change course of automobile until he
had reason to believe that plaintiff was traveling on wrong side of street, was properly refused where it was disputed question as to
whether bicyclist was on wrong side of roadway. Cheney v. Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 P. 81
(1920).

Presumptions.
Where one who is operating his vehicle on
right side of street makes survey of condition of
street ahead of him, and in doing so he observes no one coming on his side of street, but
sees one or more coming towards him on opposite side of street, he has right to assume that
such person will continue onward on opposite
side of street, and not encroach upon his side.
Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409,
186 P. 439 (1919).

"Half of the roadway" construed.
Where this section refers to "half of the roadway," the reasonable interpretation of the
meaning of this term is that it means half of
the roadway as it exists at the time it is being
traveled and not half of the roadway as it may

Violation as evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by statute are regarded as prima facie evidence of
negligence subject only to justification or excuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254
(D. Utah 1968).

Questions for jury.
In action by bicyclist for personal mJunes
sustained as result of collision with automobile
at intersection, whether bicyclist was on right
side of traveled road held for jury. Cheney v.
Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 P. 81 (1920).
In personal-injury action arising out of automobile-truck collision on highway, ultimate
question of fact as to which of two drivers
failed to keep his vehicle upon proper side of
road was for jury. Moser v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 136 (1948).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 260 et seq.
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268.

41-6-54. Passing
tions.

vehicles

A.L.R. - Automobiles: liability for U-turn
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ®'> 153.

proceeding

in opposite

direc-

Operators of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other
to the right. On roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic in
each direction, each operator shall give to the other at least one-half of the
main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 44; C. 1943,
57-7-121; 1987, ch. 138, § 53.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "operator" for "driver" both
places it appears and made a minor change in
phraseology and punctuation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

"Half of roadway" construed.
Where this section refers to half of the roadway, it means half of the roadway as it exists
at the time it is being traveled, and not half of

the roadway as it may have been laid out originally. Patton v. Kirkman, 109 Utah 487, 167
P.2d 282 (1946).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 265, § 839 et seq.

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 306.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ®'> 170(2).

41-6-55. Overtaking and passing
same direction.

vehicles

proceeding

in

The overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same direction is
subject to the following provisions:
(1) The operator of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in
the same direction shall pass to the left at a safe distance and may not
again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the
overtaken vehicle.
(2) The operator of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in
favor of the overtaking vehicle and may not increase the speed of his
vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.
(3) On a highway having more than one lane in the same direction, the
operator of a vehicle traveling in a left lane shall, upon being overtaken
by another vehicle in the same lane, yield to the over-taking vehicle by
moving safely to the right, and may not impede the movement or free flow
of traffic in a left lane except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction;
(b) when preparing to turn left;
(c) when reasonably necessary in response to emergency conditions;
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(d) to avoid actual
from an acceleration
(e) when necessary
lane other than the

,

or potential traffic moving onto the right lane
or merging lane; or
to follow direction signs that direct use of a
right lane.

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 45; C. 1943,
57-7-122; L. 1983, ch. 337, § 3; 1985, ch. 194,
§ l; 1987, ch. 138, § 54.
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amendment substituted "the following provisions" for
"those limitations, exceptions, and special
rules hereinafter stated" in the introductory
paragraph; deleted "thereof' after "to the left"
in Subsection (1); substituted "may" for "shall"
once each in Subsections (1), (2), and (3); deleted "on audible signal or visible headlight
signal" after "overtaking vehicle" in Subsec-

tion (2); deleted "who gives audible signal or
visible headlight signal" after "same lane" in
Subsection (3); and made minor changes in
phraseology.
The 1987 amendment substituted "operator"
for "driver" throughout the section, in Subsection (3) substituted "highway" for "road," deleted the former Subsection (4) which read "Violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor" and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Degree of care.
-Failure
to exercise.
Duty to sound horn.
Question of fact.
Violation as evidence of negligence.

Degree of care.
The rule, whether statutory or decisional,
which requires driver of vehicle overtaking another proceeding in same direction to pass to
the left at a safe distance, imposes a high degree of care commensurate with the circumstances involved. The driver attempts to pass
at his peril, and the situation facing him must
be such as to reasonably assure an ordinarily
prudent driver that the passing can be accomplished with safety to all occupants of the road.
Maragakis v. United States, 172 F.2d 393
(10th Cir. 1949).
-Failure to exercise.
In action under Federal Tort Claims Act, evidence disclosed that driver of government vehicle failed to exercise due care in placing himself in position of peril by attempting to pass to
the left of plaintiffs' vehicle. Maragakis v.
United States, 172 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1949).
Duty to sound horn.
Instruction that driver of automobile had no

duty to sound horn upon attempting to pass
another vehicle was objectionable on basis that
while there is no general duty to sound his
horn, driver does have duty to give audible
warning of approach and intention to pass
where it would appear from all circumstances
that such warning is reasonably necessary to
ensure safe operation. Barton v. Jensen, 19
Utah 2d 196, 429 P.2d 44 (1967).

Question of fact.
Whether defendant violated this section by
passing on wrong side of road and failing to
sound his horn is question of fact ordinarily.
Fowkes v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 46
Utah 502, 151 P. 53 (1915).
Violation as evidence of negligence.
Violation of standards of safety set by statute are regarded as prima facie evidence of
negligence subject only to justification or excuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254
(D. Utah 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.
1969).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 262 to 265.
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326.
A.L.R. - Giving audible signal where

driver's view ahead is obstructed at curve or
hill, duty and liability with respect to, 16
A.L.R.3d 897.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e,, 172(2).
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41-6-56. Passing

upon right -

41-6-57

When permissible.

(1) The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of
another vehicle only:
(a) when the vehicle overtaken is making or preparing to make a left
turn;
(b) upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for
two or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being traveled by the overtaking vehicle; or
(c) upon a one-way highway, or upon any roadway on which traffic is
restricted to one direction of movement, where the roadway is free from
obstructions and of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving vehicles.
(2) The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon
the right only under conditions permitting the movement with safety. The
movement may not be made by driving off the roadway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 46; C. 1943,
57-7-123; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 11; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 12; 1987, ch. 138, § 55.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment in Subsection (l)(c) substituted "highway" for "street" and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Arn. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 265.

41-6-57. Limitation

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 172(2).

on passing

-

Prohibitions.

(1) A vehicle may not be operated to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless the left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a
sufficient distance ahead to permit overtaking and passing to be completed
without interfering with the operation of any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction of any vehicle overtaken.
(2) Overtaking and passing under this section may not be made where
prohibited by Section 41-6-58.
(3) The overtaking vehicle shall return to an authorized lane of travel as
soon as practical, and if the passing movement involves the use of a lane
authorized for vehicles approaching in the opposite direction, before coming
within 200 feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.
1

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 47; C. 1943,
57-7-124; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 15; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 56.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment designated the previously undesignated

provisions of this section, in Subsection (1) substituted "operated" for "driven," inserted the
present
Subsection (2) and made minor
changes in phraseology
and punctuation
throughout the section.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.
Vehicles are not always prohibited from
using the left side of the highway; and when
they do so in conformity with law and in due
care, it is not negligence. Thus where defendant turned his car to the left in order to see

around a truck and see if it was clear to pass,
and was then struck by plaintiffs car coming
in the opposite direction, it was not negligence
on the defendant's part. Weenig Bros. v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 262 P.2d 491 (1953).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles
172(2).

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Arn. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 262.

41-6-58.

=

Limitations on driving on left side of road - Exceptions.

(1) A vehicle may not be operated on the left side of the roadway:
(a) when approaching or on a crest of a grade or a curve on the highway
where the operator's view is obstructed within a distance which creates a
hazard if another vehicle may approach from the opposite direction;
(b) when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection
or railroad grade crossing unless otherwise indicated by official trafficcontrol devices or a peace officer; or
(c) when the view is obstructed upon approaching within 100 feet of
any bridge, viaduct, or tunnel.
(2) This section does not apply on a one-way roadway, nor under the conditions described in Subsection 41-6-53(1)(b) nor to the operator of a vehicle
turning left onto or from an alley, private road, or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 48; C. 1943,
57-7-125; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 16; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 57.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the provision of this section
as set out in the bound volume, substituted
"operator" for "driver" throughout the section,
in Subsection (1) substituted "operated" for

"driven," in Subsection (l)(b) added "unless
otherwise indicated by official traffic-control
devices or a peace officer" at the end, in Subsection (2) substituted
"Subsection 41-653(1)(b)" for "section 41-6-53(a)(2)" and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Driving on left within 100 feet of intersection.
"Intersection" construed.
Passing within 100 feet of intersection.
Violation as evidence of negligence.
Driving on left within 100 feet of intersection.
It was held that lower court properly directed a verdict of no cause of action where
plaintiff did not make turn at intersection, but
some 50 feet prior to the intersection. Hart v.
Kerr, 110 Utah 479, 175 P.2d 475 (1946).

"Intersection" construed.
Jury was properly instructed that site of collision was "intersection" under this section in
light of evidence that crossing road intersected
main highway from both east and west and
crossed it at right angles, that main highway
was widened for about 1/10 of a mile in both
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directions to provide extra lane for acceleration
and deceleration in entering or leaving highway and that there were stop signs at both east
and west side to warn oncoming traffic. The
result was not changed by fact that crossing
road was only infrequently traveled dirt road
and not readily observable to main highway
traveler. Hathaway v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33,
439 P.2d 850 (1968).
In order to determine whether an intersection exists for purposes of Subsection (a)(2)
(now (l)(b)), it must first be determined
whether the two roads that form the juncture
are properly maintained as required by statute, and, second, it must be determined
whether a driver of the vehicle approaching
the juncture would be warned that an intersection of two public roads exists. Johnson v. Matlock, 771 F.2d 1432 (10th Cir. 1985).

Passing within 100 feet of intersection.
An instruction that a driver had no right in
attempting to pass at an intersection was error
where, at the point where the collision occurred there were no markers prohibiting passing, there was nothing to indicate a turn-off
road from the highway, and no markers showing that a road left the highway in the area.
Douglas v. Gigandet, 8 Utah 2d 245, 332 P.2d
932 (1958).
Violation as evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by statute are regarded as prima facie evidence of
negligence subject only to justification or excuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254
(D. Utah 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.
1969).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 263.
A.L.R. - Street or highway intersection

41-6-59.

within traffic rules, definition, 7 A.L.R.3d
1204.
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles eca 153.

Signs and markings on roadway
zones - Exceptions.

-

No passing

(1) (a) The Department of Transportation and local authorities may determine those portions of any highway under their respective jurisdictions
where overtaking and passing or driving on the left of the roadway is
especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the
highway indicate the beginning and end of those zones.
(b) When the signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to a
reasonably observant person, every operator of a vehicle shall obey the
directions.
(2) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone under
Subsection (1), an operator may not drive on the left side of the roadway
within the no-passing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping designed to mark the no-passing zone throughout its lengths.
(3) This section does not apply to Subsection 41-6-53(1)(b) nor to the operator of a vehicle turning left onto or from an alley, private road, or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 49; C. 1943,
57-7-126; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 17; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 13; 1987, ch. 138, § 58.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment designated the previously undesignated
provisions of Subsection (l)(a), substituted "operator" for "driver" throughout the section, in

Subsection (l)(a) substituted "highway" for
"roadway," in Subsection (l)(b) substituted "a
reasonably observant" for "an ordinarily observant," in Subsection (3) substituted "Subsection 41-6-53(1)(b)" for "section 41-6-53(a)(2)"
and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.
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One-way traffic.

(1) The Department of Transportation and local authorities may designate
any highway, roadway, part of a roadway, or specific lanes under their respective jurisdictions upon which vehicular traffic shall proceed in one direction at
all times or as otherwise indicated by official traffic-control devices.
(2) On a roadway designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be operated
only in the direction indicated by official traffic-control devices.
(3) A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be operated only to
the right of the island.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 50; C. 1943,
57-7-127; L. 1969, ch. 109, § 1; 1979, ch. 242,
§ 15; 1987, ch. 138, § 59.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the provisions of this sec-

tion, substituted "operated" for "driven" both
places it appears and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 14.

41-6-61.

Roadway divided into marked lanes-.
- Traffic-control devices.

Provisions

On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the
following provisions apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within a
single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the operator has
determined the movement can be made safely.
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes and providing for two-way
movement of traffic, a vehicle may not be operated in the center lane
except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the
same direction, and when the center lane is clear of traffic within a
safe distance; or
(b) in preparation of making or completing a left turn or where the
center lane is allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and the allocation is designated by official traffic-control devices.
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified
traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by
traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the
roadway. Operators of vehicles shall obey the directions of these devices.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 51; C. 1943,
57-7-128; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 18; 1978, ch. 33, § 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 60.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted
"operated" for "driven"

throughout the section, in Subsection (3) substituted "operators" for "drivers" and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
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41-6-62

NOTES TO DECISIONS
cuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254
(D. Utah 1968), atrd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.
1969).

Violation as evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by statute are regarded as prima facie evidence of
negligence subject only to justification or ex-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 274.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e:o 153.

41-6-62. Following another vehicle - Safe distance - Caravan or motorcade - Exception for funeral procession.
(1) The operator of a vehicle may not follow another vehicle more closely
than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of the vehicles
and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
(2) Motor vehicles operated upon any roadway outside of an urban district,
whether in a caravan, motorcade, or otherwise, or whether or not towing other
vehicles, shall allow sufficient space between each vehicle or combination of
vehicles to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy the space without
danger. This provision does not apply to funeral processions.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 52; C. 1943,
57-7-129;L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 19; 1978, ch. 33, § 15; 1987, ch. 138, § 61.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "operator"
for "driver," deleted the former Subsection (2)
concerning following by vehicles or trucks towing another vehicle, and redesignated the for-

mer Subsection (3) as Subsection (2), in Subsection (2) substituted
"an urban district,
whether" for "a business or residence district"
and inserted "or otherwise" following "caravan
or motorcade" and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Violation as evidence of negligence.
Cited.
Violation as evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by statute are regarded as prima facie evidence of
negligence subject only to justification or excuse. Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254

(D. Utah 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.

1969).
Cited in King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618
(Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jut. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 260 to 265.
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Key Numbers. - Automobiles e=> 172(2).
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41-6-66

ARTICLE 8
TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING
OR TURNING
41-6-66. Turning -

Manner -

Traffic-control

devices.

The operator of a vehicle shall make turns as follows:
(1) Right turns: both a right turn and an approach for a right turn shall
be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.
(2) Left turns: the operator of a vehicle intending to turn left shall
approach the turn from the extreme left-hand lane for traffic moving in
the same direction. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made by
turning onto the roadway being entered in the extreme left-hand lane for
traffic moving in the new direction, unless otherwise directed by an official traffic-control device.
(3) Two-way left turn lanes: where a special lane for making left turns
by operators proceeding in opposite directions has been indicated by official traffic-control devices:
(a) a left turn may not be made from any other lane; and
(b) a vehicle may not be driven in the lane except when preparing
for or making a left turn from or into the roadway or when preparing
for or making a U-turn when permitted by law.
(4) The Department of Transportation and local authorities in their
respective jurisdictions may cause official traffic-control devices to be
placed and require and direct that a different course from that specified in
this section be traveled by turning vehicles. The operator of a vehicle may
not turn a vehicle other than as directed by those devices.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 53; C. 1943,
57-7-130;L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 22; 1978, ch. 33, § 17; 1987, ch. 138, § 65.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted
"operator" for "driver"
throughout the section, in Subsection (2) rewrote the second sentence, redesignated the

former Subsection (4) as present Subsection (3)
and inserted at the beginning "Two-way left
turn lanes," redesignated the former Subsection (3) as the present Subsection (4), and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Contributory negligence.
Whether decedent's turn from an improper
position on the highway without signaling was

contributory negligence was question for jury
under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas Moving
& Storage, Inc., 451 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 3d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 256 to 259.
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 367.

A.L.R. - Automobiles: liability for U-turn
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles P 171(12).
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Turning around-Where

prohibited-Visibility.

(1) The operator of any vehicle may not turn the vehicle to proceed in the
opposite direction unless the movement can be made safely and without interfering with other traffic.
(2) A vehicle may not be turned to proceed in the opposite direction on any
curve, or upon the approach to, or near the crest of a grade, if the vehicle is not
visible at a distance of 500 feet by the operator of any other vehicle approaching from either direction.
History: L. 1941, ch.
57-7-131; L. 1975, ch. 207,
§ 66.
Amendment Notes. ment redesignated former

52, § 54; C. 1943,
§ 23; 1987, ch. 138,
The 1987 amendSubsections (a) and

(b) as present Subsections (1) and (2), substituted "operator" for "driver" throughout the
section and made minor changes in phraseol•
ogy and punctuation throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Degree of care.
The general rules as to degree of care required of a person acting in an emergency, created by wrongful act or negligence of defen-

dant, apply to this section. Morrison v. Perry,
104 Utah 139, 122 P.2d 191 (1942), rev'don
rehearing, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Automobiles: liability for U-turn
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849.

41-6-68.

Moving a vehicle -

Safety.

A person may not move a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked until
the movement may be made with reasonable safety.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 55; C. 1943,
57-7-132; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 67.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "A person may not move" for

"No person shall start"
changes in phraseology
throughout the section.

and made minor
and punctuation

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Evidence sufficient.
In action for damages arising out of collision
between motorcycle and truck, evidence was
sufficient to support jury's finding that defendant, in violation of this section, moved his

truck onto highway, from point where truck
was parked on shoulder of highway, before
such movement could be made with reasonable
safety. Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390,216
P.2d 640 (1950).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 282.
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41-6-69.

41-6-69

Turning or changing lanes - Safety - Signals Stopping or sudden decrease in speed - Signal
flashing - Where prohibited.

(1) (a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a road-

way or change lanes until the movement can be made with reasonable
safety and an appropriate signal has been given.
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be
given continuously for at least the last three seconds preceding the beginning of the turn or change.
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give a signal.
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 41-6- 70 may not be flashed
on one side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" to
operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear, or flashed on one side
only of a parked vehicle except as necessary to comply with this section.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 56; C. 1943,
57-7-133; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 96,
§ 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 24; 1978, ch. 33, § 18;
1987, ch. 138, § 68.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated former Subsections (1) and
(2) as present Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) and

redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; in Subsection (l)(a) inserted "or
change lanes" following "roadway"; in Subsection (2) substituted "operator" for "driver" and
made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Contributory negligence.
Determination of "reasonable safety."
Effect of infant's capacity upon statutory
Pedestrians.
Question for jury.
Stopping or suddenly decreasing speed.

duty.

Contributory negligence.
Whether decedent's turn from an improper
position on the highway without signaling was
contributory negligence was question for jury
under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas Moving
& Storage, Inc., 451 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1971).
Determination of "reasonable safety."
Facts may be so clear and indisputable that
it may be said as a matter of law that turn
could not be made "with reasonable safety,"
and that defendant's act in turning was, as a
matter oflaw, the sole proximate cause of the
collision and resulting damage, thus leaving to
the jury the determination of the amount of
such damage. Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah
45, 169 P.2d 777 (1946).
Effect of infant's capacity upon statutory
duty.
Consideration of an infant's age and capacity

should prevail over rule establishing negligence as a matter of law upon violation of statutory duty. This does not mean that statutory
violation rule is nullified where children are
involved. Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252
P.2d 231 (1953) (13-year-old bicyclist who
turned without signaling).

Pedestrians.
Pedestrian denied recovery for injuries sustained when she was struck by overhang of motorbus, where from the evidence it appeared
that when she was halfway across the street
the traffic light changed against her and she
stopped in the safety zone, giving the other
traffic the right-of-way, and that the overhang
of the bus struck her as it rounded the corner
in response to traffic officer's express direction.
Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah
369, 86 P.2d 37 (1939).
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Question for jury.
Whether a truck driver was negligent in failing to look in his rearview mirror at the time of
a left turn, and whether his negligence, if any,
was a proximate cause of the injury were questions for the jury. Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 Utah
2d 171, 263 P.2d 796 (1953).
Stopping or suddenly decreasing speed.
Where the statute required defendant to give
an appropriate signal before stopping or sud-

denly decreasing his speed and no hand signal
was given, the visible light showing the application of defendant's brakes was not compliance with the statute since it was simultaneous with the sudden decrease in speed, while
the statute requires that an appropriate signal
be given prior to stopping or suddenly decreasing the speed of a vehicle. United States v.
First Sec. Bank, 208 F.2d 424, 42 A.L.R.2d 951
(10th Cir. 1953).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 287.
A.L.R. - Automobiles: liability for U-turn
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849.

41-6-70.

Signals -

Key Numbers. -

Automobiles

~

151.

Methods.

A stop or turn signal when required shall be given either by the hand and
arm or by signal lamps.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 57; C. 1943,
57-7-134; L. 1955, ch. 71, § l; 1957, ch. 78,
§ 4; 1978, ch. 33, § 19; 1987, ch. 138, § 69.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

41-6-71.

Signals -

ment deleted Subsection (2), deleted the former
designation of Subsection (1) and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation.

How made.

Signals required to be given by hand and arm shall be given from the left
side of the vehicle as follows:
(1) Left turn: hand and arm extended horizontally;
(2) Right turn: hand and arm extended upward; and
(3) Stop or decrease speed: hand and arm extended downward.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 58; C. 1943,
57-7-135; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 70.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.

ARTICLE 9
RIGHT-OF-WAY

41-6-72.

Unregulated intersection
tween vehicles.

Right-of-way

be-

(1) Except as specified in Subsection (2), when more than one vehicle enters
or approaches an unregulated or an all-way stop intersection from different
highways at approximately the same time, the operator of the vehicle on the
left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise
directed by a peace officer.
(2) When approaching an unregulated intersection the operator of a vehicle
on a highway that does not continue beyond the intersection shall yield the
right-of-way to the operator of any vehicle on the intersecting highway.
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History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 59; C. 1943,
57-7-136; L. 1961, ch. 86, § l; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 25; 1987, ch. 138, § 71.

41-6-72

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment rewrote the section to the extent that a
detailed analysis is impracticable.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Contributory negligence of favored driver.
Degree of care.
Duties are relative.
Duty to yield.
Motor bike driver.
Question for jury.

Contributory negligence of favored driver.
Although driver approaching from right had
right-of-way over driver approaching from left,
the right is not absolute and one who has it
may not claim it in face of danger which one
exercising due care could see and avoid. The
driver having right-of-way was nevertheless
contributorily negligent in light of evidence
that he had not kept proper lookout. Hughes v.
Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.2d 983 (1967).
Degree of care.
In crowded street, a great.er degree of care
and vigilance is required in approaching intersections and crossings where both pedestrians
and vehicles of all kinds have right to pass
both ways, than is case between street crossings. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah
409, 186 P. 439 (1919).
Duties are relative.
The rights and duties prescribed by this section are only relative, and must be applied in
the light of the conditions existing at the time.
It is the duty of both parties to use such caution as a reasonably prudent person would
have done in entering the intersection and to
yield the right-of-way if under the circumstances a reasonably prudent person would
have done so. If failure to yield right-of-way
proximately contributed to the accident, that
may bar plaintiff or render defendant liable.
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893 (1929).
The rights of the possessor of the right-ofway under this section are only relative, and
one is not relieved of the duty of using due care
simply because he is the apparent possessor of
the right-of-way. The question is: Whose negligence was the proximate cause of the accident
and injury, and not simply who entered the
intersection first. Sine v. Salt Lake Transp.
Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1944).
Duty to yield.
Driver on left at street intersection is not

required to yield right-of-way to driver approaching from right unless collision is to be
"reasonably apprehended." Collins v. Liddle,
67 Utah 242, 247 P. 476 (1926).
Duty of drivers at street intersections is discussed at length in Sine v. Salt Lake Transp.
Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1944).
Motorist approaching intersection from right
had right-of-way over motorist approaching
from left if former either reached the intersection first or at the same time as latter. Martin
v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127
(1948).

Motor bike driver.
"Driver" as used in this section included
thirteen-year-old motor bike driver, and his
failure to yield right-of-way barred his recovery for injuries sustained when struck by motorist. Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d
168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970).
Questions for jury.
In action arising out of intersection collision,
evidence sufficiently established prima facie
case of negligence on part of defendant in failing to yield right-of-way and in traveling at
excessive rate of speed, and contributory negligence on part of plaintiff in failing to keep
proper lookout and in traveling at excessive
rate of speed was for jury. Martin v. Sheffield,
112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127 (1948).
The mere fact that a driver has the right-ofway does not excuse him from exercising due
care and keeping a proper lookout to avoid collisions with vehicles failing to yield; however,
questions relating to rights and duties of
drivers approaching intersections are primarily problems to be resolved by the trier of fact
and only when reasonable minds could not differ in reaching a contrary determination does
it become necessary to upset these factual resolutions. Country Club Foods v. Barney, 10
Utah 2d 317, 352 P.2d 776 (1960).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 236 et seq.
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 363.

41-6-72.10.

A.L.R. - What is street or highway inter•
section within traffic rules, 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 171(4).

Right-of-wayStop or yield signals-YieldCollisions at intersections or junctions of roadways - Evidence.

(1) Preferential right-of-way may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs
under Section 41-6-99.
(2) Except when directed to proceed by a peace officer, every operator of a
vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if
none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, but if
none, then at a point nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has
a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it.
After having stopped, the operator shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle
in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when the operator is moving across
or within the intersection or junction ofroadways. The operator shall yield the
right-of-way to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk.
(3) (a) The operator of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall slow down to
a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and if required for safety,
shall stop as provided under Subsection (2).
(b) After slowing or stopping, the operator shall yield the right-of-way
to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so
closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the operator
is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. The
operator shall yield to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk. If the
operator is involved in a collision with a vehicle in the intersection or
junction of roadways or with a pedestrian at an adjacent crosswalk, after
passing a yield sign without stopping, the collision is prima facie evidence
of the operator's failure to yield the right-of-way, but is not considered
negligence per se in determining liability for the accident.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-72.10, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 26; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 20;
1987, ch. 138, § 72.
.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1975,
ch. 207, § 26 repealed former § 41-6-72.10 (L.
1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1), relating to
right-of-way between vehicles, and enacted
present § 41-6-72.10.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted
"operator" for "driver"
throughout the section; in Subsection (2) substituted "peace officer" for "police officer" and
added the present third sentence; in Subsection
(3) designated the previously undesignated
provisions; in Subsection (3)(a) substituted "as

provided under Subsection (2)" for "at a clearly
marked stop line, and if none, before entering
the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or if none, then at the point nearest the
intersecting roadway where the driver has a
view of approaching traffic on the intersection
roadway before entering it"; in Subsection
(3)(b) inserted the present second sentence; in
the present third sentence substituted "If the
operator" for "Provided, that if such a driver,"
and inserted at the end of the third sentence
"but is not considered negligence per se in determining liability for the accident"; and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
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41-6-73

NOTES TO DECISIONS .
ANALYSIS

Immediate hazard.
Speeding drivers.

Immediate hazard.
Testimony that disfavored vehicle was well
into or through intersection at time of collision
with favored vehicle did not establish that approaching favored vehicle was not an immediate hazard. Cintron v. Milkovich, 611 P.2d 730
(Utah 1980).

Speeding drivers.
Right-of-way is not transferred to a disfavored driver by fact that favored driver exceeds
the posted speed. Cintron v. Milkovich, 611
P.2d 730 (Utah 1980).

41-6-73. Vehicle turning left -

Yield right-of-way.

The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall yield the rightof-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so close
to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 60; C. 1943,
57-7-137; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 27; 1987, ch. 138, § 73.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "operator" for "driver," de-

leted "within an intersection or into an alley,
private road, or driveway" following "vehicle
intending to turn to the left," and deleted
"within the intersection or" following "from
the opposite direction which is."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Burden placed on driver making turn.
Evidence.
Fulfillment of duty.
"Immediate hazard" construed.
Instructions.
Involuntary manslaughter.
Violation not found.

Burden placed on driver making turn.
When a statute prescribes that a turning vehicle must yield the right-of-way to another on
a straight of way when the latter is close
enough to constitute a hazard, it anticipates
the exercise of reasonable judgment on the part
of the driver turning. However, a burden is
placed on the driver making the turn as he has
control of the situation, and if there is a reasonable probability that the movement cannot
be made in safety then the disfavored driver
should yield. French v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 117
Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950).
Evidence.
Where prosecution grew out of a collision at
an intersection, due to alleged reckless driving
of defendant in making turn in violation of this
section, Supreme Court thought "there was
ample evidence of conduct of defendant which

jury could properly find was reckless and in
marked disregard for the rights and safety of
others." State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144
P.2d 290 (1943).

Fulfillment of duty.
If the left-turner, in performing his duty under this section by making the required observation, sees no vehicle approaching, or that
any coming are far enough away so that the
left-turner can reasonably believe that he has
time to make his turn, he may proceed. Where
a dispute arises as to this point, the question is
one for the jury. Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d
344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965).
"Immediate hazard" construed.
In action arising out of collision between automobile driven by plaintiff and truck driven
by defendant at intersection where plaintiff
made left turn across path of approaching traf-
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fie, evidence conclusively established that
truck was so close to intersection at time plaintiff made left turn as to constitute an "immediate hazard." French v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 117
Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950), distinguished,
Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d
215 (1951).
Where the defendant attempted to turn
across the path of the plaintiff, when he was
only 40 feet away, the trial court could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was so close as to
constitute an immediate hazard and that the
defendant should have yielded the right-of-way
to him. Yeates v. Budge, 122 Utah 518, 252
P.2d 220 (1953).

Instructions.
There is no right to an instruction covering
the qualifying part of this section, unless there
is evidence to support such a charge. State v.
Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943).
Involuntary manslaughter.
In a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, no criminal liability is imposed upon the
defendant because he crossed the line of oncoming traffic, unless he did so recklessly or in
willful or wanton disregard of the rights and
safety of others. State v. Adamson, 101 Utah
534, 125 P.2d 429 (1942).
In involuntary manslaughter prosecution

arising out of collision by defendant's car with
car in which decedent was riding, wherein evidence showed that latter car, making left turn
short distance beyond intersection for purpose
of entering intersecting street, had crossed almost completely over two lanes for oncoming
traffic and had made short backward movement before impact from defendant's oncoming
automobile occurred, it could not be said as
matter of law that left turn was not made in
exercise of due care and, under all evidence,
jury could find that, by reason of defendant's
intoxicated condition, he failed to react in normal manner to situation which confronted him,
and that his conduct was responsible cause of
collision and resulting
death. State v.
McQuilkin, 113 Utah 268, 193 P.2d 433 (1948).

Violation not found.
Motorist who signaled for left turn and had
almost completed it when defendant, who had
just started from parked position, collided with
rear end of motorist's car while trying to go
through intersection, was not shown to have
violated this section, notwithstanding that evidence was at best controversial and was somewhat based on estimates as to split-second circumstances as to time, distance and judgment.
Hawkins v. Allen, 16 Utah 2d 293, 400 P.2d 12
(1965).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 256.
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 363.

41-6-74, 41-6-74.10.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106 repealed § 41-6-74, as last amended by Laws
1961, ch. 86, § 1, concerning vehicles entering
a through highway.

41-6-75.

A.L.R. - What is street or highway intersection within traffic rules, 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles~
171(4).

Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106, repealed
41-6-74.10, as last amended by Laws 1961,
ch. 86, § 2, concerning failure to yield right-ofway.
§

Entering or crossing highway other than from another roadway - Yield right-of-way.

The operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from any place
other than another highway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered or crossed.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 62; C. 1943,
57-7-139; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 28; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 21; 1987, ch. 138, § 74.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "operator" for "driver" and
substituted "highway" for "roadway" both
places it appears.
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41-6-76

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Contributory negligence.
Last clear chance doctrine.
Rights and duties of drivers.

Contributory negligence.
Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, where plaintiff, driving at 25 miles per hour on icy highway, first
saw defendant's bus being backed out of yard
when plaintiff was approximately 300 feet
from defendant's driveway, and plaintiff applied his brakes when about half the distance
from the driveway upon realizing that defendant was not going to yield right-of-way, but
was unable to avoid collision with defendant
who had backed entirely across road. Nielson
v. Mauchley, 115 Utah 68, 202 P.2d 547 (1949).
Last clear chance doctrine.
The doctrine of last clear chance is well established in Utah, not only where the defendant actually knew of plaintiffs peril, but also
where defendant, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known that plaintiff was so

endangered. Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d
210, 282 P.2d 309 (1955).
As a general rule the doctrine of last clear
chance is of limited application in the case of
two moving vehicles as the application of the
doctrine in a case where both vehicles were
moving and rapidly changing positions with
respect to one another is fraught with difficulties. However, where one vehicle is moving
very slowly this limitation of the doctrine is
much less cogent. Beckstrom v. Williams, 3
Utah 2d 210, 282 P.2d 309 (1955).

Rights and duties of drivers.
This section does not give driver of vehicle
who has right-of-way the right to proceed without regard to existing conditions, and such
driver must exercise due care and act as a reasonably prudent man would act under all existing circumstances. Nielson v. Mauchley, 115
Utah 68, 202 P.2d 547 (1949).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 242.

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 347.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e-- 167(3).

Yielding.

41-6-75.5. Merging lanes

The operator of a vehicle traveling in a lane that is about to merge into
another lane shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the lane
or lanes into which the lane of the operator is merging and which are so close
as to be an immediate hazard. This section does not apply to entry lanes to
limited access highways.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-75.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 338, § l; 1987, ch. 138, § 75.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "operator" for "driver" and
made a minor change in phraseology.

41-6-76. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals - Duties
of respective drivers.

•

(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using
audible or visual signals under Section 41-6-14, 41-6-132, or 41-6-146 or of a
peace officer vehicle lawfully using an audible or visual signal, the operator of
every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and immediately move to a
position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of
the highway, clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain there until
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the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed
by a peace officer.
(2) This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency
vehicle from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of all persons using
the highway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 63; C. 1943,
57-7-140; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1955, ch. 71,
§ l; 1975, ch. 207, § 29; 1987, ch. 138, § 76.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment redesignated the provisions of this section, substituted "peace officer" for "police offi-·
cer" throughout the section, substituted "oper-

ator" for "driver" throughout the section, in
Subsection (1) substituted "under Section
41-6-14, 41-6-132, or 41-6-146," for "meeting
the requirements of this act" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 244.

41-6-76.10.

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 371.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 175(3).

Vehicle or pedestrian
- Right-of-way.

working upon highway

The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any:
(1) authorized vehicle or pedestrian actually engaged in work upon a
highway within any highway construction or maintenance area indicated
by official traffic-control devices; or
(2) authorized vehicle obviously and actually engaged in work upon a
highway when the vehicle displays lights meeting the requirements of
Section 41-6-140.20.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-76.10, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 77.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment changed the subsection designations

from letters to numbers, substituted "operator"
for "driver" and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 245.
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 382.
A.L.R. - Liability for automobile accident,
other than direct collision with pedestrian, as
affected by reliance upon or disregard of stopand-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 12.

Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance
upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2
A.L.R.3d 155.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 160(5).

ARTICLE 10
PEDESTRIANS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES
41-6-77.

Pedestrians subject to traffic-control
Other controls.

(1) A pedestrian

shall obey the instructions
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device specifically applicable to him unless otherwise directed by a peace
officer.
(2) Pedestrians are subject to traffic and pedestrian-control signals under
Sections 41-6-24 and 41-6-25.
History: C. 1953, 4106-77, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 49; 1987, ch. 138, § 78.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "peace offi-

cer" for "police officer," in Subsection (2) substituted "64-6-24" for "41-6-24," deleted former
Subsection (3), and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 285 et seq.
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§ 35; 60A
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 382.

41-6-78. Pedestrians'

Key Numbers. 160(3).

right-of-way

-

Automobiles

e=>

5 to 7,

Duty of pedestrian.

(1) (a) When traffic-control

signals are not in place or not in operation, the
operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if necessary to yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a
crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon
which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so
closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger. This
subsection does not apply under conditions of Subsection 41-6-79(2).
(b) A pedestrian may not suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety
and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute
an immediate hazard.
(2) When a vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked
crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the
operator of any other vehicle approaching from the rear may not overtake and
pass the stopped vehicle.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 65; C. 1943,
57-7-142; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
§ 31; 1978, ch. 33, § 22; 1987, ch. 138, § 79.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted
"operator" for "driver"
throughout the section, in Subsection (l)(a) in-

serted the present last sentence, in Subsection
(l)(b) deleted the former last sentence which
read "Paragraph (l)(a) shall not apply under
the conditions stated in section 41-6-79(2)" and
made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Duty of driver to yield right-of-way.
Instructions on "sudden emergency."
Right-of-way.
Rights of pedestrians generally.
-Contributory
negligence.
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Duty of driver to yield right-of-way.
Statutes or ordinances giving pedestrians
the right-of-way at street crossings create a
preferential but not an absolute right in the
pedestrian's favor, and before the duty of a
driver to yield the right-of-way arises, he must
be in a situation whereby he is either aware of
the presence of the pedestrian or should have,
in the exercise of reasonable care, become
aware of the presence of the pedestrian in time
to yield the right-of-way. Charvoz v. Cottrell,
12 Utah 2d 25, 361 P.2d 516 (1961).
Instructions on "sudden emergency."
It was not error for the trial court to refuse to
give an instruction on sudden emergency
where the plaintiffs requested instruction did
not cover the requisite element that the emergency must be one which arose without fault
on the part of the plaintiff and defendant's evidence showed that plaintiff ran in front of defendant's vehicle when the latter was too close
to avoid striking him. Gitten v. Lundberg, 3
Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115 (1955).
Right-of-way.
A pedestrian in a marked crosswalk has the
right-of-way. The right-of-way rule simply
means this: that if two persons are so proceeding that if they continued their course there
would be danger of collision, the disfavored one
must give way, and the favored one (the pedestrian) may proceed; and the favored one may
assume that this will be done. It is of course
recognized that the right-of-way rule would not
apply if, when the favored one approached the
crossing point, the disfavored one was so close
that in due care he could not or should not
reasonably be expected to give way. Coombs v.
Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 (1954).

Rights of pedestrians

generally.

-Contributory
negligence.
Rights of pedestrians to use public streets
are same as those of motorists and hence same
general duties devolve upon them, and pedes•
trian crossing public street in crosswalk or pedestrian lane, although he may have right-ofway over vehicular traffic, has duty to observe
such traffic, so that pedestrian who undertakes
to cross busy street of large city, without first
observing for vehicular traffic, is guilty of contributory negligence, even though he may be
crossing in crosswalk and have right-of-way.
Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495
(1949), where deceased pedestrian who was
struck by car while crossing street on crosswalk in Salt Lake City was held to be contributorily negligent as matter of law in failing to
keep proper lookout for approaching traffic.
In determining whether it must be ruled as a
matter of law that a pedestrian herself was
negligent which contributed to cause her injury, consideration must be given, not only to
the fact that she had the right-of-way upon
which she could place some reliance, but also
that a pedestrian crossing a busy street must
be constantly vigilant for her safety with respect to all of the conditions around her. Even
if a car is seen approaching, unless it is so
positioned as to constitute an immediate hazard to her, she is not necessarily obliged to
focus full and undivided attention on that particular car and so calculate her entire conduct
as to avoid being struck by it. Due care requires that she also keep a lookout ahead for
other pedestrians, possible holes or obstructions in the street, and at least remain aware
of the possibility of other traffic. Coombs v.
Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 (1954).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 245 to 247.
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 388.
A.L.R. - Failure to comply with statute
regulating travel by pedestrian along highway

41-6-79.

Pedestrians
destrians.

as affecting right to recovery for injuries or
death resulting from collision with automobile,
45 A.L.R.3d 658.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ea> 160(4).

yielding right-of-way - Limits on pe-

(1) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a
marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway.
(2) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where there is a pedestrian
tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing shall yield the right-of-way to all
vehicles upon the roadway.
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(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in
operation, pedestrians may not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.
(4) A pedestrian may not cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless
authorized by official traffic-control devices, and if authorized to cross diagonally, shall cross only as directed by the appropriate official traffic-control
devices.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 32; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 23;
1987, ch. 138, § 80.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1975,
ch. 207, § 32 repealed former § 41-6-79 (L.
1941, ch. 52, § 66; C. 1943, 57-7-143; L. 1969,
ch. 110, § 1), relating to pedestrians yielding

the right of way, crossing roadways only at
marked crosswalks and prohibiting pedestrians from crossing intersections diagonally,
and enacted present § 41-6-79.
Amendment Notes. - Tbe 1987 amendment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Contributory negligence.
Pedestrian walking along driveway.
Purpose of statute.

Contributory negligence.
Pedestrian was contributorily negligent as
matter of law, where he proceeded to cross
street at night at place other than marked
crosswalk, knowing that there were traffic control lights and marked crosswalks at adjacent
intersections, and failed to constantly observe
movement of approaching traffic after reaching
a position approximately eight feet past center
of street. Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206
P.2d 719 (1949).
Pedestrian who was walking across poorly lit
highway was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law where, in response to a call from
his wife, he turned and walked directly into
path of defendant's automobile. Crossing a
highway at a point where there was no marked
crosswalk, the pedestrian was duty bound to
yield the right-of-way to a vehicle upon the
roadway. Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254
P.2d 1047 (1953).
A pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence where after walking across two lanes of
a four-lane highway within a marked crosswalk she left the crosswalk and walked down
the center of the street. By attempting to cross
the street in disregard of safety rules, she was
charged with a high standard of care, the duty
being commensurate with the perilous circumstances. Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d 224, 265
P.2d 401 (1953).

Exclusion of rebuttal testimony as to motorist's speed and refusal to reopen case to permit
introduction of such testimony was not prejudicial error in suit to recover for death of pedestrian who was struck while crossing street in
area other than marked crosswalk since there
was evidence as to decedent's negligence. Duncan v. Western Refrigeration Co., 11 Utah 2d
19, 354 P.2d 572 (1960).

Pedestrian walking along driveway.
Motorist's general duty to stop before crossing sidewalk was not applicable to situation in
which pedestrian was walking along driveway
and was not on a sidewalk when struck by car
backing from garage; both parties had duty to
use due care for safety of themselves and each
other. Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5,336 P.2d
781 (1959).
Purpose of statute.
The right-of-way statutes are designed to
prevent an accident by two persons, both otherwise lawfully on the roadway, reaching the
same place at the same time. The right-of-way
is not absolute for either pedestrian or motorist, but both have a continuing duty at all
times to use reasonable care for the safety of
others, even when one has the right-of-way
over the other. Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d
272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. JUP. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 286.

41-6-79.10.

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§ 389.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 160(1).

Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals - Duties of operator - Pedestrian to yield.

(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using
audible or visual signals meeting the requirements of Section 41-6-14,
41-6-132, or 41-6-146, or of a peace officer vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an audible or visual signal, every pedestrian shall yield the right-ofway to the authorized emergency vehicle.
(2) This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency
vehicle from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of all persons using
the highway, nor from the duty to exercise care to avoid colliding with any
pedestrian.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79.10, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 33; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 24;
1987, ch. 138, § 81.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "41-6-132''

41-6-79.20.

for "41-6-140" and "peace officer" for "police
officer," in Subsection (2) substituted "operator" for "driver" and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.

Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or bar.
rier prohibited.

A pedestrian may not pass thrm,1.gh, around, over, qnder, or remain upon
any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad erossing or bridge while the gate or
barrier is dosed or is being opened or closed.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79.20, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 34; 1987, ch. 138, § 82.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

41-6-80.

ment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation.

Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid pedestrians
- Audible signals and caution~

The operator of a vehicle shall exercise care to avoid colliding with any
pedestrian and shall give an audible signal when necessary and exercise appropriate precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused,
incapacitated, or intoxicated person. This section supersedes any conflicting
provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance.
Histocy: C. 1953, 41-6-80, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 39; 1987, ch. 138, § 83.
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 196.9, ch. 111,
§ 7 repealed former§ 41-6-80 (L, 1941, ch. 52,
§ 67; C. 1943, 57-7-144; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1),
relating to driver's duty to exercise due care on
observing a child, incapacitated person or person with a white cane or guide dog. Present

§ 41-6-80 was enacted
§ 39.

by Laws 1978, ch,. 33,

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendmetit substituted "operator" for "driver", de-.
leted "or any per!'lon propelling a human powered vehicle" following "avoid colliding with
any pedestrian" and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.
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41-6-80.1. Operators to yield right-of-way to blind pedestrian - Duties of blind pedestrian - Use of cane
- Failure to yield - Liability.
(1) (a) The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any blind or
visually impaired pedestrian carrying a clearly visible white cane or accompanied by a guide dog specially trained for that purpose and equipped
with a harness.
(b) A person who fails to yield the right-of-way is liable for any loss or
damage which results as a proximate cause of failure to yield the right-ofway to blind or visually impaired persons, except that blind or visually
impaired persons shall exercise due care in approaching and crossing
roadways and shall yield right-of-way to emergency vehicles giving an
audible warning signal.
(2) A pedestrian other than a blind or visually impaired person may not
carry a cane as described in Subsection (1).
History: L. 1969, ch. 111, § 3; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 25; 1987, ch. 138, § 84.

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment designated the previously undesignated
provisions of Subsection (1); rewrote the provisions of Subsection (l)(a) to the extent that a
detailed analysis is impracticable; in Subsection (l)(b) inserted "or visually impaired" following "blind" the first place it appears, substituted "visually impaired" for "partially blind",

and substituted "giving an audible warning
signal" for "sounding a bell, a siren or other
noise device"; in Subsection (2) substituted
"visually impaired" for "partially blind, and no
other"; and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
Cross-References. - Rights and privileges
of blind and disabled persons,§ 26-30-1 et seq.

41-6-80.5. Vehicle crossing sidewalk -

Operator to yield.

The operator of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the right-of-way to
any pedestrian and all other traffic on the sidewalk.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-80.5, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 40; 1987, ch. 138, § 85.

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "operator" for "driver".

41-6-81. Repealed.
Repeals. - Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106 repealed§ 41-6-81, as enacted by Laws 1941, ch.

52, § 68, concerning pedestrians
right half of crosswalks.

41-6-82. Use of roadway by pedestrians
tivities.

-

using the

Prohibited

ac-

(1) Where there is a sidewalk provided and its use is practicable, a pedestrian may not walk along and upon an adjacent roadway.
(2) Where a sidewalk is· not provided, a pedestrian walking along and upon
a highway shall walk only on a shoulder, as far as practicable from the edge of
the roadway.
(3) Where neither a sidewalk or a shoulder is available, a pedestrian
walking along or upon a highway shall walk as near as practicable to an
outside edge of the roadway, and if on a two-way roadway, shall walk only on
the left side of the roadway.
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(4) A person may not sit, stand, or loiter in or near a roadway for the
purpose of soliciting from the occupant of any vehicle a ride, contributions,
employment, the parking, watching, or guarding of a vehicle, or other business.
(5) A pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a
degree which renders him a hazard may not walk or be upon a highway except
on a sidewalk or sidewalk area.
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a pedestrian upon a roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 69; C. 1943,
57-7-146; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71,
§ 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 35;
1978, ch. 33, § 26; 1987, ch. 138, § 86.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment in Subsection (4) inserted "contributions"
following "soliciting from the occupant of any
vehicle a ride" and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. -

60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 389.
A.L.R. - Admissibility of evidence of habit,
customary behavior, or reputation as to care of
pedestrian on question of his care at time of
collision with motor vehicle giving rise to his
injury or death, 28 A.L.R.3d 1293.

41-6-82.10.

Failure to comply with statute regulating
travel by pedestrian along highway as affecting right to recovery for injuries or death resulting from collision with automobile, 45
A.L.R.3d 658.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ec> 160(4).

Unmarked crosswalk
on pedestrian.

locations -

Restrictions

The Department of Transportation and local authorities in their respective
jurisdictions may after an engineering and traffic investigation designate
unmarked crosswalk locations where pedestrian crossing is prohibited or
where pedestrians shall yield the right-of-way to vehicles. The restrictions are
effective only when official traffic-control devices indicating the restrictions
are in place.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-82.10, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 207, § 36; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 19;
1987, ch. 138, § 87.

41-6-82.50.

Pedestrian

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation.

vehicles.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Pedestrian vehicle" means any self-propelled conveyance designed,
manufactured, and intended for the exclusive use of persons with a physical disability, but the vehicle may not:
(i) exceed 48 inches in width;
(ii) have an engine or motor with more than 300 cubic centimeters
displacement or with more than 12 brake horsepower; and
(iii) be capable of developing a speed in excess of 30 miles per hour.
(b) "Physical disability" means any bodily impairment which precludes
a person from walking or otherwise moving about as a pedestrian.
(2) A pedestrian vehicle operated by a physically disabled person is exempt
from vehicle registration, inspection, and operator license requirements. Au470
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thority to operate a pedestrian vehicle on public highways or sidewalks shall
be granted according to rules promulgated by the commissioner of public
safety.
(3) A physically disabled person may operate a pedestrian vehicle with a
motor of not more than .5 brake horsepower capable of developing a speed of
not more than eight miles per hour upon the sidewalk and in all places where
pedestrians are allowed. No permit, license, registration, authority, application, or restriction may be required or imposed upon a physically disabled
person operating a pedestrian vehicle under this subsection.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-82.50, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 98, § 1.

ARTICLE 11
BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION
41-6-83. Parents and guardians may not authorize child's
violation of chapter.
The parent or guardian of any child may not authorize or knowingly permit
the child to violate any of the provisions of this chapter.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 70; C. 1943,
57-7-147; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 88.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment deleted the subsection designation of the
former Subsection (a); deleted the former Subsection (b) regarding the applicability of regu-

lations pertaining to bicycles; and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation in the
remaining provisions.
Cross-References. - Dealer licensing of bicycles, § 11-21-1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 618 et seq.

C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles Q;,a 162(7).

41-6-84. Bicycle and moped riders subject to chapter Exception.
Every person operating a bicycle by human power or a moped has all the
rights, and all the duties and other provisions of this chapter applicable to the
operator of any other vehicle, except as otherwise specified under this article,
and except that nonmotorized bicycle operators are not subject to the penalties
related to operator licenses under alcohol and drug related traffic offenses.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 71; C. 1943,
57-7-148; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 27; 1986, ch. 36,
§ 2; 1987, ch. 138, § 89.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment substituted "propelling a bicycle by
human power has all the rights, and is subject
to the duties and other provisions" for "riding a
bicycle is subject to the provisions" and "any
other" for "a" preceding "vehicle"; added a

comma following "vehicle"; and deleted "can"
following "nature."
The 1987 amendment substituted "operating" for "propelling," "operator" for "driver,"
substituted the present last two exceptions for
"to those provisions of this chapter which by
their nature have no application" and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
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Cross-References. - Driving on right side
of highway, exceptions, § 41-6-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Child bicycle rider.
The child bicycle rider must exercise that degree of care which ordinarily would be observed by children of the same age, intelligence, and experience under similar circum-

41-6-85.

stances, and whether a child acted negligently
is a question for the jury to decide according to
this standard. Donohue v. Rolando, 16 Utah 2d
294, 400 P.2d 12 (1965).

Carrying more persons than design permits prohibited - Exception.

A bicycle or moped may not be used to carry more persons at one time than
the number for which it is designed or equipped, except that an adult rider
may carry a child securely attached to his person in a back pack or sling.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 72; C. 1943,
57-7-149; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 37; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 28; 1987, ch. 138, § 90.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

41-6-86.

ment deleted Subsection (1), relating to seats
on bicycles; deleted the Subsection (2) designation; inserted "or moped" following "bicycle";
and made a minor change in phraseology.

Persons on bicycles, mopeds, skates, and sleds
not to attach to moving vehicles - Exception.

(1) A person riding a bicycle, moped, coaster, skate board, roller skates,
sled, or toy vehicle may not attach it or himself to any moving vehicle upon a
highway.
(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or semitrailer to a
bicycle or moped if that trailer or semitrailer has been designed for attachment.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C. 1943,
57-7-150; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 29; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 91.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1) substituted "moped,

41-6-87.

coaster, skate board" for "coaster" following
"bicycle," and substituted "highway" for "roadway"; in Subsection (2) inserted "or moped" following "bicycle"; and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation.

Operation of bicycle or moped on and use of roadway - Duties, prohibitions.

(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less than the
normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the
roadway except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding
in the same direction;
(b) when preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into a
private road or driveway; or
(c) when reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not
limited to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles,
pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that
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make it unsafe to continue along the right-hand curb or edge. In this
subsection, "substandard width lane" means a lane that is too narrow for
a bicycle and a vehicle to travel safely side by side within the lane.
(2) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may not ride more
than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast may not impede the normal
and reasonable movement of traffic and, on a laned roadway, shall ride within
a single lane.
(3) Where a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 74; C. 1943,
57-7-151; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 92.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment rewrote the provisions of Subsection (1)
to the extent that a detailed analysis is imprac-

ticable; added the present Subsections (l)(a)
through (c); in Subsection (2) inserted "or mopeds" following "bicycles" in the first place it
appears; and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Contributory negligence.
The rule in this jurisdiction that a law violation is negligence as a matter of law does not
overcome the rule that the contributory negligence of a child is to be determined according
to the proper standard of care with which he is
charged. It does not mean that the statutory
violation rule is nullified where children are
involved. If the violation of a statute by a child

is found to evidence less care than that which
ordinarily could be expected of a child of the
same age, intelligence, knowledge, and experience, he could be held contributorily negligent
barring his recovery by a jury as a question of
fact about which there might be reasonable difference of opinion. Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah
540, 252 P.2d 231 (1953).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396.
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 162(7).

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 620.

41-6-87.3. Bicycles to yield right-of-way to pedestrians on
sidewalk - Where use of sidewalk prohibited Same laws as for pedestrians.
(1) A person operating a bicycle upon and along a sidewalk, or across a
roadway upon and along a crosswalk, shall yield the right-of-way to any
pedestrian and shall give audible signal before overtaking and passing a
pedestrian.
(2) A person may not operate a bicycle upon and along a sidewalk, or across
a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, where use of bicycles is prohibited by
official traffic-control devices.
(3) A person operating a vehicle by human power upon and along a sidewalk, or across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, has all the rights and
duties applicable to a pedestrian under the same circumstances.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.3, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 41; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 93.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "operating" for "propelling"

in Subsections (1) and (3), substituted "operate" for "ride" in Subsection (2) and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
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Bicycles - Parking on sidewalk,
Prohibitions.

roadway -

(1) A person may park a bicycle on a sidewalk unless prohibited or restricted by an official traffic-control device.
(2) A bicycle parked on a sidewalk may not impede the normal and reasonable movement of pedestrian or other traffic.
(3) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway at any angle to the curb or edge
of the roadway at any location where parking is allowed.
(4) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway abreast of another bicycle or
bicycles near the side of the roadway at any location where parking is allowed.
(5) A bicycle may not be parked on a roadway in a manner as to obstruct
the movement of a legally parked motor vehicle.
(6) In all other respects, bicycles parked anywhere on a highway shall conform with the provisions of Article 14 of this chapter, regarding the parking of
vehicles.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.4, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 42; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 94.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment in Subsection (6) inserted "of this chap-

41-6-87.5.

Bicycles
lanes.

ter" following "Article 14" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.

and mopeds -

Turns -

Designated

(1) A person riding a bicycle or moped and intending to turn left shall
comply with Section 41-6-66 or Subsection (2).
(2) A person riding a bicycle or moped intending to turn left shall approach
the turn as close as practicable to the right curb or edge of the roadway. After
proceeding across the intersecting roadway, to the far corner of the curb or
intersection of the roadway edges, the bicyclist or moped operator shall stop,
as far out of the way of traffic as practical. After stopping he shall yield to any
traffic proceeding in either direction along the roadway he had been using.
After yielding and complying with any official traffic-control device or peace
officer regulating traffic, he may proceed in the new direction.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) and (2), the Department of Transportation and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause official
traffic-control devices to be placed and require and direct that a specific course
be traveled by turning bicycles and mopeds. When the devices are placed, a
person may not turn a bicycle other than as directed by the devices.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.5, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 43; 1987, ch. 138, § 95.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment inserted "moped" following "bicycle"
where it appears in the first sentence of Subsection (1) and in the first sentence of Subsec-

tions (2) and (3); in Subsection (2) rewrote the
second sentence; inserted the present third
sentence; in the present fourth sentence substituted "peace officer" for "police officer"; and
made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.
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41-6-87.7. Bicycles

and mopeds -

Turn signals.

(1) Except as provided in this section, a person riding a bicycle or moped
shall comply with Section 41-6-69.
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given
continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the bicycle or
moped before turning, and shall be given while the bicycle or moped is stopped
waiting to turn. A signal by hand and arm need not be given continuously if
the hand is needed in the control or operation of the bicycle or moped.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.7, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 44; 1987, ch. 138, § 96.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment inserted "or moped" following "bicycle"
each place it appears.

41-6-87.8. Bicycle and moped inspections
officer.

-

At request of

A peace officer may at any time upon reasonable cause to believe that a
bicycle or moped is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its
equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, require the person riding the
bicycle or moped to stop and submit the bicycle or moped to an inspection and
a test as appropriate.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.8, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 45; 1987, ch. 138, § 97.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment inserted "or moped" following "bicycle"
each place it appears and made minor changes
in phraseology and punctuation.

41-6-87.9. Bicycle racing - When approved
tions - Exceptions - Authorized
from traffic laws.

- Prohibiexemptions

(1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited under Section 41-6-51, except
as authorized in this section.
(2) Bicycle racing on a highway is permitted when a racing event is approved by state or local authorities on any highway under their respective
jurisdictions. Approval of bicycle highway racing events may be granted only
under conditions which assure reasonable safety for all race participants,
spectators, and other highway users, and which prevent unreasonable interference with traffic flow which would seriously inconvenience other highway
users.
(3) By agreement with the approving authority, participants in an approved bicycle highway racing event may be exempted from compliance with
any traffic laws otherwise applicable, if traffic control is adequate to assure
the safety of all highway users.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.9, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 46; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 98.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

ment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation.
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Bicycles and mopeds hand on handlebars.

Carrying bundle -

One

A person operating a bicycle or moped may not carry any package, bundle,
or article which prevents the use of both hands in the control and operation of
the bicycle or moped. A person operating a bicycle or moped shall keep at least
one hand on the handlebars at all times.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 75; C. 1943,
57-7-152; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 38; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 99.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-

41-6-89.

Bicycle quired.

ment rewrote the provisions of this section to
the extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable.

Prohibited

equipment

-

Brakes re-

(1) A bicycle may not be equipped with, and a person may not use upon a
bicycle, any siren or whistle.
(2) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake or brakes which enable its
driver to stop the bicycle within 25 feet from a speed of 10 miles per hour on
dry, level, clean pavement.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 76; C. 1943,
57-7-153; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 31; 1987, ch. 138, § 100.

Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation.

41-6-90.

and reflective

Bicycles
quired.

-

Lamps

material

re-

(1) Every bicycle in use at the times described in Section 41-6-118 shall be
equipped with a lamp on the front emitting a white light visible from a distance of at least 500 feet to the front and with a red reflector of a type approved by the department which is visible for 500 feet to the rear when directly in front of lawful lower beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle.
(2) Every bicycle when in use at the times described in Section 41-6-118
shall be equipped with reflective material of sufficient size and reflectivity to
be visible from both sides for 500 feet when directly in front of lawful lower
beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle, or in lieu of reflective material, with
a lighted lamp visible from both sides from a distance of at least 500 feet.
(3) A bicycle or its rider may be equipped with lights or reflectors in addition to those required by Subsections (1) and (2).
History: C. 1953, 41-6-90, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, § 50; 1987, ch. 138, § 101.
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1978,
ch. 33, § 50 repealed former § 41-6-90 (L.
1941, ch. 52, § 77; C. 1943, 57-7-154; L. 1955,
ch. 71, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 39), relating to

lights and reflectors on bicycles operated at
night, and enacted present § 41-6-90.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Violation as negligence.
Riding of bicycle in dark without a lamp was
violation of this statute and thus established
some negligence as a matter of law. Whether

the absence of the lamp was the contributing
proximate cause of the collision between bicycle and taxicab was jury question. Gibbs v.
Blue Cab, 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213 (1952).

ARTICLE 12
RAILROAD TRAINS AND SAFETY ZONES
41-6-91, 41-6-92.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Sections 41-6-91, 41-6-92 (L.
1941, ch. 52, §§ 78, 79; C. 1943, 57-7-155,

57-7-156), relating to passing railroad trains,
were repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 74.

41-6-93. Driving on tracks.
(a) It is unlawful for the driver of any vehicle proceeding upon any track in
front of a railroad train upon a street to fail to remove such vehicle from the
track as soon as practicable after signal from the operator of such train.
(b) When a railroad train has started to cross an intersection no driver of a
vehicle shall drive upon or cross the tracks or in the path of such train within
the intersection in front of such train.
History:
57-7-157.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 80; C. 1943,

41-6-94. Driving through safety zone.
No vehicle shall at any time be driven through or within a safety zone.
History:
57-7-158.

L. 1941, ch. 52, § 81; C. 1943,

ARTICLE 13
SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop - Driving
through, around or under gate or barrier prohibited.
(a) Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade
crossing, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than
ten feet from the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he
can do so safely when:
(1) A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warning
of the immediate approach of a train.
(2) A crossing gate is lowered, or when a human flagman gives or
continues to give a signal of the approach or passage of a train.
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